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Abstract
In “Wanted: An Ethos of Personal Responsibility,” Professor Kleinberger sought to prompt debate about
the moral preconceptions of the legal profession. Professor Morawetz responded in his essay, “Layers
and Conscience.” This article responds, commenting on Morawetz’s arguments that (1) excessive
pessimism about lawyer morality is unfounded and counterproductive; (2) the public’s antipathy toward
lawyers is inevitable given the role lawyers play in our society; (3) codes of ethics can and do have an
uplifting influence on the morals of lawyers; and (4) law schools can and do train moral judgment.
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ETHOS AND CONSCIENCE-A REJOINDER
by Daniel S. Kleinberger
In "Wanted: An Ethos of Personal Responsibility" I sought to
prompt debate about the moral preconceptions of our profession. Professor Morawetz has been good enough to begin that debate with his
essay, "Lawyers and Conscience."' I wish now to continue the discussion by responding to what I see as Professor Morawetz's four main
substantive2 points: (1) excessive pessimism about lawyer morality is
1. Morawetz, Lawyers and Conscience, 21 CONN. L REv. 383 (1989).
2. Professor Morawetz also criticizes two parts of my analysis from a technical perspective.
He terms paradoxical the use of Hobbes and his theory "to illustrate the need for moral reflction," and he characterizes the campaign manager analogy as "peculiar" and unpersuasive. Id. at
292-93. The Hobbes problem is, I think, a minor one. I chose Hobbes for his descriptions of the
uncivilized state, which have always seemed to me especially evocative and scary. The descriptions
lend color and emotional content to more intellectual formulations such as "ensure the domestic
tranquility." I do not seek to make any other use of Hobbes' theory.
The issue of the campaign manager analogy is more significant. Professor Morawctz asserts
that "the processes and values [involved in lawyering and campaign managing) are too dissimilar"
for the comparison to be persuasive. Id. at 393. He supports this conclusion by asserting that the
services of the campaign professional are essential to an effective use of the democratic decisionmaking process, and that, consequently, the technical experts "should forestall prejudging" their
principals because "withholding resources from candidates based upon moral preconceptions can
be compared to a kind of censorship." Id. Morawetz's thesis is precisely analogous to what I have
termed the "servant of civil liberties" argument. See Kleinberger, Wanted: An Ethos of Personal
Responsibility-Why Codes of Ethics and Schools of Law Don't Make for Ethical Lawyers, 21
CoNN. L. REv. 365 (1989). Lawyers, it is claimed, should forestall prejudging their principals,
because lawyer assistance is essential to effective use of the legal system, and withholding resources from clients comes dangerously close to the suppression of civil liberties.
There are of course differences in the values reflected in the legal system and those which are
reflected in the electoral system, e.g., due process vs. the sovereignty of the people. There are also
differences in the nature of the decisionmaking process within the two systems, e.g., in the legal
system, argument based on formal reasoning and formal determination of facts; in the political
system, no formal fact-finding, argument often based on ideology, opinion or worldview. But these
differences do not undercut the fundamental parallel between the two systems. Each system constitutes a system for making decisions. The decisions made in the respective systems, and the very
process of decision-making in both systems, embody the most cherished values of our society. In
both the legal and the electoral systems, the process of decision-making has become so complicated that lay participants must have the assistance of technical experts. If it is logical for lawyers
to use the system they serve to justify ethical neutrality, it is likewise logical for campaign managers to do so. In our culture, however, we associate the campaign professional with the ends he or
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unfounded and counterproductive; (2) the public's antipathy toward
lawyers is inevitable given the role lawyers play in our society; (3)
codes of ethics can and do have an uplifting influence on the morals of
lawyers; (4) law schools can and do train students in moral judgment.3
I. PESSIMISM VS. REALISM
Professor Morawetz warns of the danger of: "see[ing] lawyers as
beyond change and beyond redemption, [of] see[ing] the members of
the profession as self-selected for moral unresponsiveness. Under such
an assumption, there is no reason to urge reform or to admonish lawyers to heed morality since lawyers are assumed to be incapable of do'4
ing so."
It would be self-contradictory, I agree, to preach redemption to
those for whom sin is inevitable. But it would be comparably useless to
preach virtue without taking into account the very real, deeply rooted
aspects of our profession that conduce toward sin.
As I have tried to show, the profession's ideology invites moral
insensitivity.5 Training in the profession's academies tends to mothball
and to devalue whatever inclination would-be lawyers might have had
toward thinking in moral terms.' In what is increasingly the business
rather than the profession of law, economics makes moral awareness a
costly inconvenience.7
These observations do not mean that lawyers cannot be moral.
They do, however, point to ideological, institutional and material impediments to lawyer morality. They warn, I believe, that mere proselytizing will not work.8 To make sustainable improvements, we must address the underlying impediments.
she chooses to serve.
3. Morawetz, supra note 1.
4. Id. at 387.
5. Kleinberger, supra note 2, at 368-69.
6. Id. at 378-80; see also infra note 30.
7. Id. at 377-78.
8. Concern over lawyers' ethics has produced a considerable amount of such proselytizing. For
instance, in August 1988, the ABA recommended that local bar associations consider adopting
creeds of professionalism. American Bar Ass'n Annual Meeting, 57 U.S.L.W. 2094, 2095 (Aug.
16, 1988). The President of the ABA opened the new year by calling "professionalism issues...
nearly a universal concern." Raven, Professionalism:Meeting the Challenge with New Resolve,
75 A.B.A. J.8 (1989).
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II. THE PuBLic's INEVITABLE ANTIPATHY

Professor Morawetz also cautions against overemphasizing the
popular disenchantment with lawyers. As Morawetz states, the "unpopularity of lawyers is endemic to the role they play, and the role is, in
turn, endemic to organized society." 9
With this observation I agree, but it seems to me that the observation leaves unexplained the profession's own recognition that "things
are getting worse."' 1 Moreover, the public's antipathy seems to be
changing character. Ethics complaints are mounting, as are malpractice claims against attorneys."
Perhaps these objective manifestations result from the "specific
cultural, social, and economic conditions" that Professor Morawetz
considers at least partially beyond the profession's control.1 2 Equally
likely, however, is that lawyer conduct has changed. Concern for one's
standing with colleagues used to function as a check on abusive conduct. Today, the explosive increase in the size of the bar has virtually
eliminated professional reputation as a safeguard in most
communities. 3
At the same time, the temptations toward abusive conduct have
increased. The "cuckoo of acquisitiveness" is truly out, and lawyers increasingly and consciously shape their conduct in reference to "the bottom line.'1 4 There is also the problem of increasingly abusive tactics of
litigation. Although frivolous lawsuits may result in Rule 11 sanc9. Morawetz, supra note 1, at 395.
10. See Leighton, Incivility Breeds Disrespect, 45 BENCH & B. MINN. 3 (July 1988); Miner,
Lawyers Owe One Another, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 19, 1988, at 13 ("lawyer to lawyer dishonesty seems
to be on the rise").
11. Kleinberger, supra note 2, at 365-66. Legal malpractice claims were relatively rare until
the mid-1970s. Since that time, "there have been as many reported legal malpractice decisions as
in the entire history of American jurisprudence. In fact, during the last ten years there have been
four times as many decisions as in the previous decade." Mallen, The Profile of Legal Malpractice Liability, in LAw Fuiub LiABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS: PRACCAL APPROACHES FOR A DimCULT MARKEr 3 (1986).
12. Morawetz, supra note 1, at 395.
13. Leighton, supra note 10, at 3.
14. The distorting influence of the "bottom line" is so great that at least one law firm has
found it necessary to remind itself in writing that: "We reject. . . the concept that the practice of
law is to be shaped by a profit orientation which diverts and obstructs us from the achievement of
our professional goals." Gering, Law Firms Adopt Credos,75 A.BA. J. 56, 57 (1989). The statement is from the firm credo adopted by the Seattle law firm of Ryan, Swanson & Cleveland. The
credo goes on to state: "We view our ultimate objective as the rendering of service, and the making of profit is only a component, albeit an important component, in the pursuit of that objective."
Id.
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tions, 15 it may take a saint (or at least someone morally aware) to eschew the tactics of "hard ball" and "scorched earth.""6
I do not contend that greed and professional "hard ball" are new
to the profession. I do suggest that they may be more prevalent today,
and that, to growing numbers of lawyers, greed as an element of professional decisionmaking and "Rambo" as a model of professional conduct are coming to be viewed as legitimate. If the temptation toward
misconduct is greater, and if the social restraints are less than heretofore, then the moral sensitivity of individual lawyers is now more important than ever.17 Indeed, the public's dislike of lawyers is fundamentally more than a reflection of "the role they play."""
III.

THE EFFiCACY OF CODES

Professor Morawetz strongly disputes my contention that codes of
ethics are largely ineffective in stimulating moral sensitivity. Morawetz
argues that "[t]he effect of codes is not necessarily exhausted by the
process of disciplinary enforcement and the rules are not necessarily
moral minima. At least for some lawyers, codes will affect attitudes,
and therefore behavior, by defining a standard of conscientiousness and
exhorting lawyers to follow it.""9
In theory, I agree, but in practice, Professor Morawetz's theory is
rarely realized. Lawyers, even those most centrally involved in debates
on lawyer morality, tend to regard codes as mere rules of conduct. For
example, Professor Geoffrey Hazard, Reporter for the Kutak Commis15. See Oliphant, Rule II Sanctions and Standards: Blunting the Judicial Sword, 12 WM.
L. REv. 731 (1986). Some commentators believe that Rule 11 may be chilling valid
claims. See Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended FederalRule l--Some "Chilling" Problems In
the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEo.L.J. 1313 (1986); Note, Plausible
Pleadings: Developing Standardsfor Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARv. L. REv. 630 (1987).
16. Judge Miner recently wrote: "[M]y teeth are set on edge by the Wyoming lawyer who
said that his object is battle, and by the Cleveland lawyer who said that today 'litigation is war,
the lawyer is a gladiator, and the object is to wipe out the other side.'" Miner, supra note 10, at
14 (quoting Margolick, At the Bar: Rambos Invade the Courtroom,N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1988, at
B5, col. 1). Even though the majority of lawyers are not litigators, the profession still takes its
tone from the litigation context. Kleinberger, supra note 2, at 367 n.12. As Professor Morawctz
states, "The theme of legal representation is that of victory and defeat, rather than that of harmony and cooperation." Morawetz, supra note 1, at 394.
17. J.KULTGEN, ETHICS AND PROFESSIONALISM 62, 77-78 (1988) (the professional ideal of
service is an important counterforce to the self-interested individualism flourishing in society).
18. Morawetz, supra note 1, at 395. See also Reavley, A Perspective on the Moral Responsibility of Lawyers, 19 TEx. TECH L. REv. 1393 (1988) (public disfavor is in part justified by
improper tactics and by a disregard for "the larger moral obligations to society").
19. Morawetz, supra note 1, at 386-87.
MITCHELL
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sion, recently discussed the propriety of an ex parte communication by
a lawyer to the judge in the Drexel Burnahm Lambert, Inc. litigation.2"
Although noting that the judge considered the phone call clearly improper, Professor Hazard turned a lawyer's eye on three separate codes
of conduct and concluded: "When these rules are carefully parsed, the
perhaps surprising conclusion is that the lawyer's call to Judge Pollack
was not a violation of the professional rules." 21
In my experience as a member of a local bar disciplinary committee, Professor Hazard's approach is far more recognizable than Professor Morawetz's aspirations. 2 Similarly, most law schools approach the
subject of ethics from a practical angle: "Few [professional] schools
devote entire courses to professional ethics. The major exceptions are
law schools, but the emphasis is on [the] ABA's disciplinary
rules,
2' 3
conscience.
of
than
rather
law
of
force
the
have
which
Professor Morawetz himself provides the best evidence for the proposition that codes of ethics rarely inspire. He notes that the ABA's
1969 Code of Professional Responsibility contains not only disciplinary
rules but also ethical considerations. He implies that the existence of
formal ethical considerations "makes clear" that a code of ethics can
rise above the minimalist level, and can elucidate, define and exhort. 4
Even assuming that the Code and its "ECs" once served such a function, the Code is old news. The profession's most recent distillation of
its ethical ideals is the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and the
Rules have done away with the ethical considerations of the Code.25
20.
21.

Hazard, Ex Parte Talk Isn't Always Plainly Wrong, Nat'l L.,
Id. (emphasis added).

Nov. 21, 1988, at 15.

22. It is true that the ABA has called upon local bar associations to adopt creeds of professionalism, but the very resolution that did so "carefully point(ed] out. . . that such a creed would
neither supersede existing disciplinary codes or the ABA's own Model Rules of Professional Conduct nor alter existing standards of conduct for imposing negligence liability on lavvers." American Bar Ass'n Annual Meeting, 57 U.S.L.W. 2094, 2095 (Aug. 16, 1988). Even when lawyers
talk of aspirations, their thoughts are never far from questions of enforceable sanctions.
23. J. KULTOEN, supra note 17, at 151. The profession itself has perhaps inadvertently reinforced this "minimalist" orientation by requiring that students pass a multiple choice exam on
lawyers ethics as a prerequisite for bar admission. Success on the exam requires an understanding
of the rules stated in the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. Students, naturally enough, seek law school ethics courses that will prepare them to take
the exam. I overheard a student in my law school recently advising a colleague to avoid taking
Professional Responsibility with Professor X. "S/he asks a lot of uncomfortable questions about
what you think is right, and never spends any time teaching you the rules for the exam.'
24. Morawetz, supra note 1, at 386 n.17.
25. The Rules do contain Comments, but the Comments do not play the same supplemental,
admonitory role as did the Ethical Considerations of the Code. "The Comment accompanying
each Rule explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the Rule. . . . The Comments are
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THE MORAL EDUCATION OF LAW STUDENTS

The "de-moralizing effect" of a law school education has little, if
anything, to do with "teachers who are committed to an amoral model
and who teach evasion" or with "students [who] normally lack misgivings or conscience.1 26 The impediments to moral sensitivity result-almost as a byproduct 2 7 -from the traditional law school curriculum and pedagogy.
In the "Ethos" essay, I suggested that law schools could contribute
to the moral development of their students by letting "the skills of fact
determination, analysis, analogy, and distinction focus for a time on the
profession itself."2 a8 Here I want to give some examples of how this focus might work. First, however, I would like to note an additional impediment to effective moral discourse with law students. Most students,
I believe, arrive at law school with very little experience or expertise in
the rigorous discussion of moral issues. 29 What students do feel relatively confident about is their ability to do "book reports"-i.e., to read
the assigned text and then report back a summary of the important
points. For many students this type of confidence is central to their
self-concept; skills of this sort are part of the reason they (and their
friends and families) believe they will be good lawyers.
In the first weeks of law school, however, this confidence disappears. "Book reports" that would suffice in college are shown in the law
school classroom to be shallow, inapposite or simply wrong. Even if the
professor takes care to make the disabusing process as gentle as possible, analysis becomes an arena of anxiety rather than confidence. It is
no longer safe to assume one's competence in intellectual discourse.
Clearly this is no time to start voicing opinions about morality, an area
in which the typical student has little analytic expertise.
Despite this problem, and others discussed in the "Ethos" essay,80
there are at least two ways in which law schools can effectively help
students scrutinize their future profession and their future roles. Most
intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each Rule is authoritative." MODEL RULES

OF

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT preamble (1983).

26. Professor Morawetz states that my "description [of law school education] sometimes
comes close to embodying these assumptions." Morawetz, supra note 1, at 387.

27. This "by-product" argument is rather mild compared to, for example, the comments of
Karl Llewellyn pertaining to the function of the first year of law school. See Kleinberger, supra
note 2, at 378 n.67.
28. Id. at 381.
29. Id. at 380 n.73.
30. Id. at 378-80.
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directly, the schools can teach courses about the role of the lawyer.
Such courses would be an amalgam of sociology, psychology and philosophy. An example is provided by the "Work of the Lawyer" seminar
developed by Professors Hamilton and Janus and now taught in several
sections at the William Mitchell College of Law. 31 That course encourages students to recognize the moral issues inherent in professionalism
and to pay attention to their own moral sensibilities.
Courses about the role of the lawyer can also adopt a more traditional approach, focusing on legal doctrines. While a law student, I had
the good fortune to take a seminar, taught by Professor Jay Katz, on
the law of informed consent. The seminar addressed the relevant legal
doctrines in both the doctor-patient and lawyer-client contexts. While
legal principles typically provided the starting point for discussion, just
as typically the discussion expanded to consider moral questions such
as autonomy, paternalism, and the obligations inherent in expertise.
The "consciousness raising" accomplished by that course continues to
influence the way I approach my clients and my profession.3"
As Professor Morawetz notes, it is also important to integrate the
discussion of moral issues into traditional classes. 3 I tried that recently
in a class on Business Organizations. We had been discussing the traditional corporate law doctrine that holds that directors of a corporation
should concern themselves with making profits for the shareholders,
and not with making the world a better place in which to live.4 I posed
this hypothetical:
31. According to its most recent syllabus, the course studies "the often conflicting moral, professional, financial, personal and political imperatives inherent" in the work of the lawyer. Syllabus for Work of the Lawyer, William Mitchell College of Law, Spring Semester 1989. Topics
include: the law school experience, methodology of examining the lawycring experience, paternalism, problems of control and manipulation, women in the law, lawyers and social justice, and
lawyer and self.

32. For reasons explained previously, see supra notes 20-21, I do not regard the existence of
separate courses on ethics as especially promising.
33. Morawetz, supra note 1, at 388.
34. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919)
(unlawful to withhold dividends so as to support the controlling shareholder's benevolent wish to
make cars affordable for the average American). This doctrine, however, has been gradually eroding. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 I11.App. 2d 173, 181, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (1968) (refusal

to play night baseball because it would be "bad for baseball" not actionable unless decision involves fraud or waste). In fact, in at least one jurisdiction, statutory change has abolished the
doctrine. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.251(5) (West Supp. 1989) (in making decisions the directors
may consider "the interests of the corporation's employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors, the
economy of the state and nation, community and societal considerations, and the long-term as well
as short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders").
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Assume you are counsel to a multinational corporation which is
incorporated in a state which follows the traditional doctrine. The chair
of the Board of Directors seeks your help, telling you that: (1) the
Board believes that the corporation's commercial involvement in the racist South African economy is morally wrong; (2) the Board wishes to
pull the corporation out of South Africa without delay; (3) the Board's
best economic estimate is that, both in the short and long term, such a
pullout would cost the corporation money. The chair tells you that she
and her fellow directors are willing to divest, but they do not want to
be exposed to personal liability in a shareholders derivative suit. 85 The
chair asks you whether you would help put together a disingenuous paper trail so that the directors' collective act of conscience will not open
them to personal liability. Assuming that you agree with the chair
about the immorality of economic involvement in South Africa, should
you agree to help?
One student quickly and emphatically answered yes. To that student I then posed the following hypothetical:
Assume you are a lawyer advising the National Security Council.
A dedicated Marine Colonel, who is attached to the Council, seeks
your help and tells you that (1) Congress has shortsightedly chosen to
abandon a group of Central American freedom fighters whose continued viability depends on receiving support from the U.S.; (2) by the
time Congress recognizes the error of its ways the cause of freedom
will have suffered significant injury; (3) he and several colleagues have
devised a method of providing stop-gap aid to the freedom fighters. The
Colonel asks your help in providing a disingenuous paper trail which
will protect the plan from premature disclosure, and his colleagues and
himself from personal liability. Assuming that you agree with the Colonel's views on the importance of the freedom fighters and the errors of
the Congress, should you provide the Colonel the assistance he seeks? 0
The resulting discussion used the full panoply of techniques of legal analysis, and did more than merely illustrate the complexity of the
35. The theory behind such a suit would be as follows: by considering morality instead of the
economic best interests of the corporation, the directors will have breached their duty of care (and
possibly loyalty) to the corporation; that breach will have damaged the corporation. Shareholders,
acting on behalf of the corporation, will seek to recover from the directors the damages proximately caused by the directors' breach of duty.
36. The two hypotheticals are not completely analogous. As the student who responded to the
South Africa hypothetical pointed out, there is a difference between lying to cover up conduct
which is improper under the civil law, and lying to cover up criminal conduct. Still, enough parallels exist to provoke thoughtful discussion.
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means-ends debate. When a substantive course devotes the scarcest of
resources, class time, to a discussion of moral concerns, the message
sent is that such concerns are worthy of attention in the study and,
impliedly, in the practice of law.
CONCLUSION

The best way to conclude is to thank Professor Morawetz for his
comments and to state a principle on which he and I clearly agree: "All
of us are responsible for the consequences of our conduct. If we play a
role in a larger system, we must be able to justify both the role and the
system." 3

37.

Morawetz, supra note 1, at 395.
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